







COALITON FORMATION AND STABILITY* 
 









Corresponding author:  J. Alcalde, Dep. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, University of Alicante, 
03071 Alicante, Spain.  E-mail: alcalde@merlin.fae.ua.es / Fax +34 965903898. 
 
Editor: Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. 
Primera Edición Junio 2005 
Depósito Legal: V-3024-2005 
  
IVIE working papers offer in advance the results of economic research under way in order to 
encourage a discussion process before sending them to scientific journals for their final 
publication. 
                                                 
 
* We are grateful to Ana Bogolmolnaia, Guillaume Haeringer, Javier M. López--Cuñat, Josep E. Peris, 
Pablo Revilla and two anonymous referees for their comments. Romero--Medina acknowledges financial 
support from DGICYT, project BCE-2002-02194 and Comunidad de Madrid Project 06-0170-2004. 
Alcalde's work is partially supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, project SEJ 
2004--08011/ECON, FEDER, and Institut Valencià d'Investigacions Económiques. 
 
** J. Alcalde: GEPYD and Department of Economics, University of Alicante.  A. Romero-Medina: 




COALITION FORMATION AND STABILITY 
 






 This paper studies a class of NTU coalition formation games in 
which every player's payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We 
identify four natural conditions on individuals' preferences and show that, 
under each condition, stable (core) allocations exists. 
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